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APPENDIX A

[UNPUBLISHED ORDER NOT TO
BE CITED PER CIRCUIT RULE 53]

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604

Argued November 28, 1995
April 9, 1996

Before

Hon. Daniel A. Manion, *Circuit Judge*
Hon. Ilana D. Rovner, *Circuit Judge*
Hon. Terence T. Evans, *Circuit Judge*

MARTIN W. MYERS,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

No. 95-2344 *v.*

THOMAS C. BURNS, HOITE C.
CASTON, K. RICHARD KEELER,
Trustees of Urantia Foundation, et al.,

Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.
No. 94 C 927—**Ann Claire Williams,** *Judge.*

ORDER

Martin W. Myers, a former trustee of the Urantia Foundation, sought a declaration that the other trustees

improperly removed him from the Urantia's Board of Trustees. The district court granted defendants summary judgment. Myers appeals. We affirm.

The Urantia Foundation is a charitable not-for-profit trust created in 1950 pursuant to a Declaration of Trust to promote the principles, teachings and doctrines of the Urantia Book.[1] The Declaration of Trust provided that the Trust Estate "shall be managed by a Board of Trustees."

Martin W. Myers was one of the five trustees of the Urantia Foundation from 1972 until 1993. In 1992 and 1993, the defendants, who are the other four trustees, unanimously voted at three consecutive quarterly meetings to remove Myers as a co-trustee of the Foundation. In an affidavit submitted in support of defendants' motion for summary judgment, co-trustee Caston averred that Myers was removed because of his "unprofessional outbursts," "attacks and vendettas against Board members," "angry and unprofessional abrupt exits from Board meetings," and "derogatory remarks and characterizations about . . . fellow Trustees."

Shortly after his removal from the Board, Myers filed suit in the Circuit Court of Cook County alleging that he was improperly removed. The defendants removed the case to federal court based on diversity of citizenship and a controversy in excess of $50,000. The defendants then moved for summary judgment, asserting that Myers' removal was proper because the unambiguous terms of the Declaration of Trust allowed the removal of a trustee "for

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[1] The Urantia Book is described as "religious revelation[s]" of "epochal significance."

any reason by a unanimous vote of the remaining trustees. . . ." The district court agreed with the defendants and granted them summary judgment. We also agree.

Section 7.5 of the Declaration of Trust governs the removal of trustees from the Urantia Board of Trustees and provides:

> 7.5 REMOVAL OF TRUSTEE: Any Trustee may be removed for any reason by a unanimous vote of the remaining Trustees, and upon the casting of such a unanimous vote of the remaining Trusses, they shall thereupon execute a certificate under the hands and seals of said remaining Trustees certifying to the casting of such vote and to the removal of such Trustee, and the same shall be filed for record as provided in paragraph 9.1. Upon the execution and recordation of such certificate, a vacancy in the number of Trustees shall be deemed to exist.

The undisputed evidence presented by the defendants in support of their motion for summary judgment demonstrated that the trustees voted unanimously, not once but three times, to remove Myers. The undisputed record also evidences that the general counsel filed a certificate of removal as required by the Declaration of Trust. Thus, the procedure for removing Myers conformed with the Declaration of Trust. Under Illinois law courts are obligated to carry out the stated intent of the settlor of a trust. *First Nat'l Bank of Chicago v. Canton Council of Campfire Girls, Inc.*, 426 N.E.2d 1198, 1201 (Ill. 1981) ("The court's primary concern in construing a trust is to discover the settlor's intent, which the court will effectuate if it is not contrary to law or public policy."); *Ford v. Newman*, 396 N.E.2d 539, 540 (Ill. 1979) (intent of settlor should be ascertained, where possible, from the trust instrument itself).

On appeal, Myers presented a myriad of arguments as to why the district court erred and why his removal was improper. However most of his voluminous arguments and the documents supporting them focus on the reasons why the other trustees wrongly voted to terminate him. While he obviously disputes the distasteful facts leading up to his discharge, it is not the duty of this court to sort out the unfortunate facts surrounding this dispute. Rather, we look only at whether the terms of the trust were properly executed. The only argument meriting any mention concerns Urantia's By-Laws. The Urantia By-Laws were adopted by the Trustees pursuant to section 7.6 of the Declaration of Trust which provided that the trustees "shall adopt by-laws . . . for the government of the Foundation and of the acts and procedures of the trustees." Section 2.4 of the By-Laws addressed the issue of removal of trustees and provides:

> When, in the opinion of a majority of the Trustees, any Trustee has failed or refused to assume and perform his duties and responsibilities, or has done or permitted any act or thing which is inconsistent with or in degradation of the teaching of The Urantia Book, or by his acts or omissions has brought disrepute upon himself or URANTIA FOUNDATION, then, the Trustees shall cast a ballot on the question of whether or not such Trustee should be removed. Such ballot shall be cast at the first regular quarterly meeting of the Board of Trustees next succeeding the meeting at which the determination aforesaid shall have been made. A ballot on the question of whether or not such Trustee shall be removed shall be cast again at each of the next two regular quarterly meetings at which all of the other Trustees shall be present. If all of the Trustees other than the Trustee whose removal is being considered shall cast a ballot

> at each successive meeting as aforesaid for the removal of such Trustee, then said other Trustees shall executed a Certificate of Removal certifying to the removal of such Trustee, which certificate shall be in the following form:

Here the Certificate of Removal acknowledges the unanimous vote for removal and states that removal occurred after "due deliberation and the exercise of fair and impartial judgment. . . ."

Myers interprets the By-Laws differently. Based on Section 2.4 of the By-Laws and the Certificate's statement that the trustees acted with "fair and impartial judgment" in removing the trustee, Myers contends that he could only be removed as a trustee for "cause" and then only after a full-blown, trial-like hearing. But Myers' interpretation of the By-Laws conflicts with the unambiguous language of the Declaration of Trust which provides for removal "for any reason." And Article 7.6 of the Declaration of Trust only authorizes the trustees to adopt By-Laws which are "not inconsistent with the provisions of th[e] Declaration of Trust." Myers' suggested reading would directly conflict with the Declaration of Trust. Also the By-Laws do not require any specific procedures for the removal hearing. To the extent that the By-Laws required certain procedures, the defendants presented uncontroverted evidence that they voted unanimously at three consecutive quarterly meetings to remove Myers from the Board of Trustees. Myers' removal was therefore proper and summary judgment appropriate. *Stratmeyer v. United States*, 67 F.3d 1340, 1345 (7th Cir. 1995) (we shall affirm the district court's summary judgment if there is no genuine issue of material fact and if the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law);

Ford, 396 N.E.2d at 541 (affirming grant of summary judgment where trust instrument resolved dispute).

Myers attempts to draw the court into his dispute with the Urantia Foundation by referencing several distasteful controversies involving him and other trustees. We need not involve ourselves with the personality conflicts that led to Myers' removal. We need only apply the trust documents. That application is straightforward; the Board of Trustees complied with the Declaration of Trust and the By-Laws in removing Myers as a trustee. Accordingly, the district court's decision is

AFFIRMED.

APPENDIX B

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604

May 6, 1996

Hon. Daniel A. Manion, *Circuit Judge*
Hon. Ilana D. Rovner, *Circuit Judge*
Hon. Terence T. Evans, *Circuit Judge*

MARTIN W. MYERS,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

No. 95-2344 *v.*

THOMAS C. BURNS, HOITE C. CASTON, K. RICHARD KEELER, Trustees of Urantia Foundation, et al.,

Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.
No. 94 C 927—**Ann Claire Williams,** *Judge.*

ORDER

On consideration of the Petition for rehearing and suggestion for rehearing en banc filed in the above-entitled cause by Plaintiff-Appellant, no judge in active service has requested a vote thereon, and all of the judges on the original panel have voted to deny a rehearing. Accordingly,

IT IS ORDERED that the aforesaid petition for rehearing be, and the same is hereby, DENIED.

APPENDIX C

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
Eastern Division

MARTIN W. MYERS **JUDGMENT IN A CIVIL CASE**

v.

THOMAS C. BURNS,
et al CASE NUMBER: 94 C 927

____ Jury Verdict. This action came before the Court for a trial by jury. The issues have been tried and the jury has rendered its verdict.

__X__ Decision by Court. This action came to a hearing before the Court. The issues have been heard and a decision has been rendered.

IT IS ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that pursuant to the court's memorandum opinion and order entered May 09, 1995, defendants motion for judgment on the pleadings is denied and the alternative motion for summary judgment is granted.

Date: May 9, 1995

H. Stuart Cunningham
Clerk

(By) Deputy Clerk

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[Dated May 9, 1995]

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION

Case No. 94 C 927

MARTIN W. MYERS,

Plaintiff,

v.

THOMAS C. BURNS, HOITE C. CASTON, K. RICHARD KEELER, PATRICIA SADLER MUNDELIUS, Trustees of the Urantia Foundation, and PHILIP A. ROLNICK, an individual represented to be a newly elected Trustee,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiff Martin W. Myers is a former trustee of the URANTIA Foundation. Myers seeks a declaration that he was improperly removed as a trustee of the URANTIA Foundation, and a court order reinstating him as a trustee. Defendants are the current trustees of the URANTIA Foundation. This case is presently before the court on defendants' Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings and Alternative Motion for Summary Judgment. For the reasons stated below, defendants' Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings is denied and the Alternative Motion for Summary Judgment is granted.

Background

The URANTIA Foundation is a charitable Illinois not-for-profit common law trust created in 1950 to educate man about his relation to God and the Universe, and to promote the principles, teachings, and doctrines of the URANTIA Book. (Decl. of Trust, Art. II). In 1992 and 1993, defendants (with the exception of newly appointed trustee Philip A. Rolnick) unanimously voted at three consecutive quarterly meetings to remove Myers as a co-trustee of the Foundation. In an affidavit submitted in support of defendants' motion for summary judgment, defendant Caston asserts that Myers was removed because of *inter alia*: (1) his "unprofessional outbursts," (2) "attacks and vendettas against Board members," (3) angry and unprofessional abrupt exits from Board meetings," and (4) "derogatory remarks and characterizations about . . . fellow Trustees." (Aff. of Hoite C. Caston, Para. 17). Myers' fellow trustees did not provide him with a written copy of any formal "charges" before voting to remove him. According to defendant Caston, "The Trustees decided that they would consider the question of removal in informal private discussions at the quarterly meetings." (Caston Aff., para. 14).

Shortly after his removal, Myers filed the instant suit in the Circuit Court of Cook County, alleging that defendants' failure to provide him with a formal "due process hearing" constituted a breach of the express and implied terms of the governing Declaration of Trust. The case was removed to this court in February 1994.

Discussion

I. *Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings*

A. *Standing*

Defendants' primary argument in support of their motion for judgment on the pleadings relates solely to Myers' standing to bring this suit. "Standing is the aspect of justiciability that focuses on the qualifications of the party bringing the suit; the essence of the inquiry is 'whether the litigant is entitled to have the court decide on the merits of the dispute or of particular issues.' " *Frank Rosenberg, Inc. v. Tazewell County*, 882 F.2d 1165, 1168 (7th Cir. 1989) (quoting *Warth v. Seldin*, 422 U.S. 490 (1975)). As defendants properly note, standing is a threshold issue. If Myers lacks standing to bring this action, this court has no power to adjudicate the merits of the dispute. *Warth*, 422 U.S. at 498.

Defendants challenge Myers' standing on the ground that, as a general rule, only the Illinois Attorney General can bring suit to enforce the terms of Illinois charitable trusts. This proposition finds wide, long-standing support in the case law. *See, e.g., Art Institute of Chicago v. Castle*, 133 N.E.2d 748 (Ill. App. 1956); *Courtney v. Wilson*, 63 N.E.2d 794 (Ill. App. 1945). As the court explained in *Castle*, 133 N.E.2d at 751, this rule recognizes the attorney general's special role as the defender of the people's interests, and serves to protect charities from "the vexation, delay and expense" that would inevitably occur if mere membership in the community at large allowed one to maintain a suit for the enforcement of a charitable trust.

In *Castle*, the National Sculpture Society, a group of sculptors, sought to enforce a $1 million charitable trust

created to finance the erection and maintenance of statutes and monuments through Chicago. *Castle*, 133 N.E.2d at 749-50. The sculptors challenged the trustees' plan to use trust funds to finance the construction of an annex to the Chicago Art Institute. According to the sculptors, the planned expenditure violated the express terms of the trust, and would deprive their members of the opportunity to profit from the erection of the statues and monuments contemplated by the grantor. *Id.* at 750-51. The court denied the sculptors' petition for leave to intervene, noting that "no individual seeking purely personal gains has any right in a suit involving the enforcement of a charitable trust," and that as the "authorized representatives of the people," the state's attorney and the attorney general had the exclusive right to control the case. *Id.* at 751 (citing *Courtney*, 63 N.E.2d 794).

Courtney, relied on heavily by the *Castle* court, has a similar theme. There, an artist sought to enforce a charitable trust created to provide for the construction of a memorial to Alexander Hamilton. *Courtney*, 63 N.E.2d at 795-80. Having previously worked with the grantor on the project, the artist was well positioned to receive the commission for the memorial. When the trustees ultimately abandoned the artist's plan, the artist sought a court order obligating the trustees to complete the memorial. *Id.* at 799-8. In rejecting the artist's claim, the court explained that as a private citizen seeking merely to further a personal cause, he had no right to maintain a proceeding to enforce or interfere in a charitable trust created to benefit the people generally. *Id.* at 800.

Unlike the plaintiffs in *Castle* and *Courtney*, Myers purports to bring suit as a co-trustee exercising his fiduciary duty to redress breaches of the charitable trust

he was charged with administering. Courts and legal scholars have long agreed that trustees have standing to enforce charitable trusts notwithstanding the attorney general's special role as protector of the people's interests in those trusts. *See, e.g., Holt v. College of Osteopathic Physicians and Surgeons*, 394 P.2d 932, 935-36 (Cal. 1964); *Takabuki v. Ching*, 695 P.2d 319, 327 (Haw. 1985); *Ball v. Mills*, 376 So.2d 1174, 1182 (Fla. App. 1979). "It is clear . . . that where there are several trustees one of them may maintain an action against the others to enforce the trust or to compel the redress of a breach of trust." IVA William R. Fratcher, *Scott on Trusts*, § 391 (4th ed. 1989). *See also Stuart v. Continental Illinois Nat'l Bank and Trust Co.*, 369 N.E.2d 1262 (Ill. 1977) (authorizing attorneys fees to be paid out of trust in suit between co-trustees); Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 391, cmt. b (1959) ("[a] suit for the enforcement of a charitable trust can be maintained by one or more of several trustees against the other trustees").

The distinction drawn by courts between efforts by private citizens to secure benefits from charitable trusts and enforcement actions brought by trustees is an important one. Unlike the public at large, trustees have a duty to ensure the proper administration of their trusts, and can even be held liable for failing to prevent certain breaches. *Ball*, 376 So.2d at 1181. " 'The charity's own representative has at least as much interest in preserving the charitable funds as does the Attorney General who represents the general public. The co-trustee is also in the best position to learn about breaches of trust and to bring the relevant facts to a court's attention.' " *Holt*, 394 P.2d at 936 (quoting Karst, *The Efficiency of the Charitable Dollar: An Unfulfilled State Responsibility*, 73

Harv. L. Rev. 433 (1959)). While concerns regarding vexatious litigation are certainly valid in the context of suits by the public at large, these considerations simply do not apply to enforcement actions by trustees who are, of course, limited in number. *Id.*

Defendants argue, in the alternative, that even if co-trustees generally have standing to sue to enforce charitable trusts, no such standing exists here where plaintiff seeks "purely personal gain"—namely, his reinstatement as a trustee of the URANTIA Foundation. The court disagrees. As an initial matter, the court has found no cases similarly limiting trustees' authority to redress alleged breaches of trust. The cases cited by defendants, *Castle* and *Courtney*, discuss plaintiff's personal motivations in the context of suits brought by members of the general public, not enforcement actions brought by individuals charged with the specific task of administering and safeguarding a charitable trust. Moreover, as Myers notes, what defendants characterize as a selfish attempt to hold onto Myers' position as a trustee can be just as easily described as a well-intentioned effort to redress an equally opportune effort by the defendants to wrest control of the foundation in violation of the express terms of the trust. In the court's view, any limitation on standing that requires courts to scrutinize the personal motives of the enforcing trustee would be unworkable. The fact that plaintiff has alleged, and seeks to redress, defendants' breach of specific terms of the trust provides him with sufficient standing to maintain this suit.

Finally, the court rejects defendants' assertion that their removal of Myers as a trustee divested him of any standing to enforce the trust. Myers alleges that his purported removal violated the terms of the trust, and was

therefore ineffective. If he is right, and for purposes of standing, the court will assume that he is,[1] he is still a trustee and has standing to maintain this suit.

B. *Absence of State Action*

Defendants move for judgment on the pleadings on the ground that because Myers has failed to allege state action, he cannot prevail on his "procedural due process" claims. This argument also fails.

As noted above, Myers' entire case is predicated on his claim that the terms of the charitable trust mandate certain procedures for removal of trustees. Although the parties loosely refer to the claim as one for "contractual," and, alternatively, "procedural" due process, the due process clauses of the United States Constitution are not directly implicated by this action. As his Amended Complaint makes clear, Myers merely alleges that the Declaration of Trust incorporates many of the procedural safeguards embodied in the due process clause, and that defendants' failure to abide by these procedures in ousting him as a trustee constituted a breach of the trust. (Amended Comp., ¶25). State action is simply not an element of Myers' claim. Defendants' motion for judgment on the pleadings is denied.

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[1] "For purposes of ruling on a motion to dismiss for want of standing, both the trial and reviewing courts must accept as true all material allegations of the complaint, and must construe the complaint in favor of the complaining party." *Warth*, 422 U.S. at 501.

II. *Alternative Motion for Summary Judgment on Amended Complaint*

Defendants have also filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that their removal of Myers complied with the express, unambiguous terms of the Declaration of Trust. The court agrees, and grants summary judgment in favor of defendants.

"The court's primary concern in construing a trust is to discover the settlor's intent, which the court will effectuate if it is not contrary to law or public policy." *First Nat'l. Bank of Chicago v. Canton Council of Campfire Girls, Inc.*, 426 N.E.2d 1198, 1201 (Ill. 1981). Under Illinois law, intent is to be ascertained if possible, from the instrument itself. *Ford v. Newman*, 396 N.E.2d 539, 540 (Ill. 1979); *In re Estate of Steward*, 480 N.E.2d 201, 203 (Ill. App. 1985).

Here, the Declaration of Trust is unambiguous regarding the removal of trustees:

> 7.5 REMOVAL OF TRUSTEE: Any trustee may be removed *for any reason* by a unanimous vote of the remaining Trustees, and upon the casting of such a unanimous vote of the remaining Trustees, they shall thereupon execute a certificate under the hands and seals of said remaining Trustees certifying to the casting of such vote and to the removal of such Trustee, and the same shall be filed for record . . . .

(Declaration of Trust, Para. 7.5) (emphasis added). It is undisputed that the remaining trustees voted unanimously, not once, but several times, to remove Myers. Under the express terms of the trust, nothing more was required of them to remove Myers as a trustee for the Urantia Foundation. *Cf. Scott on Trusts* Section 107.2. "Where the power of removal is conferred without limi-

tation, it is unnecessary for the person exercising the power to show cause for the removal."

Citing Article II of the Declaration of Trust, plaintiff asserts that the removal powers of the trustees must be exercised in accordance with the guiding principals of the Urantia Foundation. Article II of the Declaration of Trust sets forth the "principal" and "concordant" objects of the Foundation. The two paragraphs that comprise this section of the trust instrument describe the Foundation's purposes in the most general of terms, and by no means can be read to alter the specific removal provision set forth in Article VII.

Somewhat more persuasively, Myers also cites section 2.4 of the By-Laws of the Urantia Foundation, which unlike Article II of the Declaration of Trust, does specifically address the removal of trustees. Section 2.4 provides:

> When, in the opinion of a majority of the Trustees, any Trustee has failed or refused to assume and perform his duties and responsibilities, or has done or permitted any act or thing which is inconsistent with or in degradation of the teaching of THE URANTIA BOOK, or by his acts or omissions has brought disrepute upon himself or URANTIA FOUNDATION, then, the Trustee shall cast a ballot on the question of whether or not such Trustee should be removed. Such ballot shall be cast at the first regular quarterly meeting of the Board of Trustees next succeeding the meeting at which the determination aforesaid shall have been made. A ballot on the question of whether or not such Trustee shall be removed shall be cast again at each of the next two regular quarterly meetings at which all of the other Trustees shall be present. If all of the Trustees other than the Trustee whose removal is being considered shall cast a ballot at each successive meeting as aforesaid for the re-

> moval of such Trustee, then said other Trustees shall execute a Certificate of Removal certifying to the removal . . . .

(By-Laws, Sec. 2.4). In the model certificate of removal alluded to in section 2.4 of the by-laws, the remaining trustee must affirm that the vote of removal was taken "after due deliberation and the exercise of fair and impartial judgment." *Id.* Myers argues that section 2.4 narrows the unfettered removal discretion granted to the remaining trustees in the Declaration of Trust, requiring the trustees to hold a full "due process hearing" replete with formal written charges, supported by specific, substantiated evidence. (Pl. Response at 5-11).

There are two problems with this argument. First, even if the by-laws could be read as restrictively as plaintiff suggests, the Declaration of Trust, not the by-laws, is controlling. Article 7.6 of the Declaration of Trust authorizes the trustees to adopt by-laws "not inconsistent with the provisions of th[e] Declaration of Trust." In the court's view, the imposition of the restrictive procedural requirements suggested by plaintiff would be patently inconsistent with the broad, essentially unfettered, removal powers conveyed by Article 7.5 of the trust instrument.

The court also disagreed with plaintiff's reading of the applicable section of the by-laws. While the by-laws do appear to limit the substantive grounds on which a trustee can be removed, section 2.4 does not provide "removed" trustees with any additional procedural safeguards, other than the requirement that the remaining trustees vote for removal at three consecutive meetings. No mention is made of the necessity for formal written charges, or a special hearing affording the trustee with

an opportunity to plead his case. Under Illinois law, the court is not free to add any restrictions or limitation on the trustees' powers not specified in the trust instrument itself. *Gorin v. McFarland*, 247 N.E.2d 620, 622 (Ill. App. 1969).

Finally, the court is unpersuaded by Myers' references to the procedures afforded the only other URANTIA trustee to have been removed pursuant to the remaining trustees' Article 7.5 powers. While the "custom and practice" of contracting parties is sometimes useful for interpreting ambiguous contract provisions, this kind of evidence provides little guidance in interpreting trust instruments. Here, it is the *settlor's* intent, not the intent of the trustees that must be determined. At best, evidence of the customs and practices of past trustees simply provides the court with insight into the trustees' understanding of the settlor's intentions. However, as the court recognized in *Gorin v. McFarland*, *supra*, the trustees' understanding of the settlor's intent is not controlling. "[W]hatever may have been the belief or whatever may have been the practice, neither acquire immortality unless immortality is given them in the instrument creating the trust."[2] This is especially true here where the trust instrument is unambiguous and plaintiff's "custom and usage" argument hinges on a single prior instance of removal. Finding that the removal of Myers, following a unanimous vote of the remaining trustees,

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[2] *Id.* At 622. Plaintiff in *Gorin* unsuccessfully sought to challenge a majority trustee vote on the grounds that for the prior 25 years all trustee decisions had been made on the basis of unanimous votes. The court rejected the challenge after noting that nothing in the trust instrument required the trustees' self imposed restriction on their previous exercises of power. *Id.*

complied with all of the requirements of the governing trust instrument, the court grants summary judgment in favor of the defendants.

Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, defendants' Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings is denied and the Alternative Motion for Summary Judgment in granted. As previously noted, the allotted time for appeal begins to run with the entry of this Memorandum Opinion and Order.

ENTER:

/s/ Ann Claire Williams

Ann Claire Williams, Judge
United States District Court

Dated: May 9, 1995